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The case can also be viewed as a further recognition of the basic
principles of our federal system, which allow the states to develop
their own approaches to issues not demanding of national uniformity
and which hold that power not expressly delegated to the national
government is reserved to the states.
LINUS

COURTS-JURISDICTION-STATE

ASSUMPTION

JOHNSON

OF JURISDICTION

OVER

A

DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN ENROLLED RESERVATION INDIANS

Plaintiff and defendant were both enrolled members of Indian
tribes1 and both resided within the exterior boundaries of Indian
reservations.2 They were married pursuant to Montana law outside
the boundaries of any Indian reservation. Northern Cheyenne Indian
marriages have been performed and divorces granted pursuant to
Montana law since 1937, when the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council
adopted a provision in the tribal code requiring all marriages and
divorces to be so consummated. 3 Plaintiff filed for a divorce in
the state district court and defendant was served with process while
she was within the boundaries of a Montana reservation. Defendant
moved to dismiss the action on the grounds the state court lacked
personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted
the motion to dismiss on both counts. Plaintiff appealed. The Montana
Supreme Court reversed and held that since the marriage took
place off the reservation, the tribal ordinance effectively granted,
the district court jurisdiction over the divorce action and validated
the service of process on the defendant inside the reservation. Bad
Horse v. Bad Horse, Mont.-, 517 P.2d 893 (1974).
The Indian tribes were once separate nations within the United
States. Conquest and the imposition of treaties induced these nations
to surrender their complete independence and the right to go to
war. In return, the tribes were given federal protection, aid, and
grants of land. In 1830, Georgia attempted to impose its laws on
the Cherokee Reservation. In Worcester v. Georgia,' which chal1. Plaintifff is an enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe. Defendant
Is an enrolled member of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in
North Dakota.
2. Plaintiff resides within the boundaries of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.
Defendant was residing at Poplar, Montana, located within the boundaries of the Fort
Peck Indian Reservation when served with process.
3. N. CHEY. TRIBAL CODE, ch. 3, § 1 ,(1966) provides:
All Indian marriages and divorces must be consummated in accordance with
the laws of the State of Montana, except that no common-law marriages
shall be recognized within the bounds of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation.
4.Worcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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lenged the constitutionality of those laws, Chief Justice Marshall
laid down the broad principles which became accepted as law.5
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community, occupying
its own territory .

.

. in which the laws of Georgia can have

no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, ...
and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between
the United States and this nation, is by our constitution
and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.6
With the exception of a few cases,7 the basic policy underlying
Worcester has survived."
Another attempt to define the tribal-state jurisdictional relationship came in 1959. Williams v. Lee9 involved a civil suit in Arizona
Superior Court against reservation Indians for goods sold to them
by a non-Indian operating a reservation store. Congress had previously shown its willingness to allow any state to assume jurisdiction
over reservation Indians by enacting a general statute allowing
the people or state legislature to affirmatively accept such responsibility. 10 Since Arizona had not accepted jurisdiction in accordance
5. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
7. Suits by Indians against non-Indians have been sanctioned in state courts. See United
States v. Candeleria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892). State
courts have been allowed to assume jurisdiction of the prosecution of one non-Indian for
the murder of another non-Indian within reservation boundaries. See New York ex rel. Ray
v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United
States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
8. But see Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72-74 (1962)
The general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, [31 U.S. (]6 Pet.[) 515, 561[(1882)] . . . that an Indian
reservation is a distinct nation within whose boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded to close analysis when confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with diverse concrete situations. By 1880 the Court no
longer viewed reservations as distinct nations. On the contrary, it was said
that a reservation was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction except as forbidden by federal law ....
The policy of assimilation was reversed abruptly in 1934. A great many
allottees of reservation lands had sold them and disposed of the proceeds.
Fur'ther allotments were prohibited in order to safeguard remaining Indian
properties ....
Concurrently the influence of state law increased rather than decreased.
* . . Congress in 1929 authorized the States to enforce sanitation and 'quarantine laws on Indian reservations, to make inspections for health and educational purposes, and to enforce compulsory school attendance. . . . In 1934
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts with
States for the extension of educational, medical, agricultural, and welfare assistance to reservations, . . . . During the 1940's several States were permitted to assert criminal jurisdiction, and sometimes civil jurisdiction as well,
over certain Indian reservations. . . . A new shft in policy toward termination
of federal responsibility and assimilation of reservation Indians resulted in
the abolition of several reservations during the 1950's....
In 1953 Congress granted, to several States full civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, consenting to the assumption of such jurisdiction by any additional States making adequate provision for this In the future. . . . Thus Congress has to a substantial degree opened the doors of reservations to state laws, in marked contrast to what prevailed in the time of
Chief Justice Marshall.
9. William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
10. The Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), as amended 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970). pro-
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with this statute, the Supreme Court held that to allow the state
court to exercise jurisdiction in the case "would undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." '11
The standard applied in Williams was whether in the absence of
any "governing Acts of Congress, . . . the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them."'1 2 The Williams test is reflected in Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan,8 wherein the Court, in discussing the
state's jurisdiction over Indian reservations, stated,
[O]n reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless such application would interfere with reservation selfgovernment or impair a right granted or reserved by federal

law. 14

The Supreme Court ruled in Kennerly v. District Court 5 that
vided the procedure for this assumption of jurisdiction:
Sec. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission
of a state, the consent of the United States Is hereby given to the people of
any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing
Statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurlsdiction In accordance with the provisioins of this
Act: Provided, that the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with
respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people
thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the
case may be.
Sec. 7. The consent of the United States Is hereby given to any other State
not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for In this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by
affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.
Id.
Section 7 was repealed by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1323(b) (1970).
But § 1323(b) provides that "such repeal shall not affect any cession of jurisdiction made
pursuant to . . . [sec. 7] prior to its repeal." The repeal of sec. 7 reflected Congress' intent as stated by Senator Ervin in comments relevant to Title IV of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970):
This title repeals section 7 of Public Law 280, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 588)
and authorizes States to assert civil . . . jurisdiction in Indian country only
after acquiring the consent of the tribes in the States by referendum of all
reservation Indians.
114 CoNe. REv. 394 (1968).
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title IV, § 402(a), 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970), was
adopted in the following form:
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any state not having Jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such State
to assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian, country . . . or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same
extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causs of action, and
those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and affect within such
Indian country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.
11. 358 U.S. at 223.
12. Id. at 220.
13. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
14. Id. at 75. This case involved the question of whether Alaska could regulate trapfishing by the Kake and Angoon tribes. It was held that Alaska could regulate the fishing
because no reservation existed from which the right to fish might be implied.
The same question was involved in Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S.
45 (1962), but the Metlakatla lived on a reservation. The State of Alaska here was not
allowed to regulate the Metlakatla's trap-fishing.
15. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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a state was required to strictly follow either the procedure set
down in the Act of 195316 or in the procedure in the Civil Rights
Act of 196817 if it is to assume civil jurisdiction over Indian country.
The acceptable procedure under the Act of 1953 would have been
affirmative legislative action by the state while the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 requires tribal consent, manifested by a majority vote
of the enrolled Indians of the affected reservation, as a prerequisite
to the assumption of state jurisdiction. 8 The current federal position
is that state laws are not applicable to tribal Indians except where
Congress has authorized state intervention. 9
Since Kennerly, the Montana Supreme Court has held that Montana courts did not have jurisdiction over a real estate mortgage
foreclosure decree on Indian trust lands on the Crow Reservation"
or over Indian juveniles involved in alleged acts of delinquency
on the reservation 21 because of the state's failure to conform to
the formal jurisdictional assumption procedures in the Act of 1953
or the Civil Rights Act of 1968. In 1973, in State ex rel, Iron Bear
v. District Court,22 the Court assumed jurisdiction of a divorce
action between two enrolled Indians living on an Indian reservation.
The Court reasoned that the state retained jurisdiction over areas
of the law where it was not preempted by Congress or where it
did not infringe upon the Indians' right to govern themselves.23
16. 67 Stat. 588 (1953), as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 1320-23 (1970).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970).
18. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971). This case was concerned solely
with the procedural aspects by which tribal consent must be manifested under the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, and does not consider their consent as to place, time, or geographical
considerations.
In Kennerly the state was not allowed to assume civil jurisdiction over an action to
recover a debt owed by reservation Indians to a grocery store on the reservation. The
Court held that a unilateral action by the Tribal Council in enacting a tribal law conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the state was insufficient to vest the state with civil
jurisdiction under the Act of 1953, the state not having taken the requisite affirmative
legislative action, or under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, there never having been an election
to obtain tribal consent as required. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
19. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
North Dakota's jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country Is governed by N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-19 (Supp. 1973), which provides for the assumption of state Jurisdiction
over civil causes of action which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian
citizens upon petition of a majority of the adult enrolled residents, upon the affirmative
vote of the majority of the enrolled adult residents, or upon Individual acceptance of state
jurisdiction by individual Indians. The North Dakota Supreme Court has decided that state
Jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on the reservation was completely disclamed
by N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19 (Supp. 1973) unless accepted in the manner specified in that
chapter. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963). Recently the Court reaffirmed
this position and decided that where the Indians had not accepted state jurisdticon over
civil suits the state court did not have jurisdiction over a cause of action involving enrolled
members of a reservation that arose out of an automobile accident within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation. The Court denied plaintiffs claim that she was being denied due process if the state court wasn't allowed to assume jurisdiction on the ground
that the plaintiff had the same privileges as any other citizen in maintaining suits in the
courts of North Dakota; the courts would be without jurisdiction if anyone tried to bring a
suit against an Indian. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
20. Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971).
21. Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972).
22. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, Mont., 512 P.2d 1292 (1973).
23. Id. at -,
512 P.2d at 1299. There was a 1938 tribal enactment ceding jurisdiction
over divorce matters to the State of Montana and the Court noted that the power to grant a
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The Kennerly holding was avoided, since the Court in Iron Bear
"did not consider the jurisdiction remaining in the state after federal

action or tribal assumption of government.

.

.

.,24

The Court held

that strict compliance with the Williams test in these residual jurisdictional areas sufficed to authorize the Court to assume jurisdic25
tion of this divorce action.
In Bad Horse v. Bad Horse2 6 the Montana Supreme Court departed from its position in Iron Bear27 and adopted the rationale
that had been expressed in a concurring opinion in that case. Jurisdiction was assumed because the marriage took place off the reservation pursuant to the laws of Montana. If the marriage had been
performed within the boundaries of the reservation, the Court would
have been forced to recognize the Kennerly prerequisites to the
assumption of state jurisdiction over this action. The Court noted
that there is no denial of equal protection even though subject
matter jurisdiction is denied because of the federal prohibition
against the state's assumption of jurisdiction of Indian civil actions
arising on the reservation except as provided by law. 28 The Court
cited the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 29 in which federal consent is
given to any state to assume jurisdiction over Indian causes of
action arising within Indian country. The Court reasoned that this
statute did not hamper the state's assumption of jurisdiction because
the statute was simply inapplicable to the action. The marriage
was performed outside the boundaries of the reservation. 0
The Court also proceeded to find the Williams infringement test
inapplicable. 1 The Williams test has traditionally been applied to
cases involving non-Indians3 2 and was designed to resolve the tribalstate jurisdictional conflict which arises in a cause of action to
3
Such a conflict did
which Indians and non-Indians are parties.8
not exist in Bad Horse, because the 1937 tribal provision, providing
that all marriages and divorces be consummated in accordance
with Montana law, 34 effectively vacated the tribe's jurisdictional
interest in the subject matter.3 5
The Court here is "concerned with protecting the equal rights
divorce had not been preempted by the federal government. The Indians' right to selfgovernment is not infringed because the power to terminate a marriage contract is not one
which will interfere with tribal sovereignty.
at -,

24.

Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
517 P.2d 893 (1974).
Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, -Mont.-,
512 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1978).
State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, -Mont-,
-Mont--,
517 P.2d 893, 894 (1974).
§
1322(a)
(1970).
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title IV, § 402(a), 25 U.S.C.
-Mont-,
517 P.2d 893, 895 (1974).
Id. at 895-96.
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commissioner, 411 T.S. 164, 179 (1973).

33. -Mont.-,

34. Id. at 896.
35. Id. at 895.

512 P.2d at 1297.

517 P.2d 893, 895-96 (1974).
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of a person under the Montana Constitution to maintain an action
in the courts of this state."38 Equal protection exists only,,when
the state courts are open to all persons on an equal basis. 3 7 Indians

are state citizens and thus are equally entitled to bring any action
in state courts that has not been expressly retained in the United
States by Congress.38
To support this position the Court looked to Bonnet v. Seekins"'
where the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana Courts are
open to Indian citizens in regard to matters not affecting the federal
government. Furthermore, the Court found this reasoning in harmony with the aim of the Act of 1953 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 "to place the Indian in a legal status similar to that of
all citizens, and abolish laws which adversely discriminate against
the Indians." 40 To deny the plaintiff access to the state courts
in this matter would be to deny him a remedy to which others
41
are entitled under the Montana Constitution.
Resolution of the second issue, namely, whether the defendant,
who was served with process while on the Fort Peck Reservation,
was beyond the personal jurisdiction of the Montana courts, follows
from the decision that the state court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter.4 2 The Court found that once the state court has
assumed subject matter jurisdiction and process has been served
in accordance with the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant cannot claim that the reservation boundaries effectively
shield her from state service of process. 3 A federal Indian reserva44
tion is not off limits to state process servers.
The general position of the Congress and the federal courts
seems clear. The states are prohibited from exercising general civil
jurisdiction over Indian causes of action arising within Indian country
without the Indian's requesting the states to do so. The Montana
Supreme Court is intent on striking at what it calls the "myth
of Indian sovereignty [that] has pervaded judicial attempts by
state courts to deal with contemporary Indian problems."4 5 The
Court argues that only by removing the "strictures of Indian sovereignty can the state courts enter the arena and meet the problems
of the modern Indian. ' "4 6 Only by convincing a majority of Indians
on each reservation that the state courts can effectively deal with
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41,
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 3 (1889) and art. II, § 16 (1972).
-Mont.-,
517 P.2d 893, 895 (1974).
Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317 (1952).
-Mont.-,
517 P.2d 893, 896 (1974).
Id.
Id. at -,
512 P.2d at 894.
Id. at , 512 P.2d at 897.
Id.
Id.

46.

Id.
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modern Indian problems will the day come when the state courts
are asked to enter the arena. Justice demands that remedies be
provided where tribal jurisprudence is inadequate and access to
state courts is prohibited. But again the Indian citizens hold the
key; only when they feel confident that the advantages of state

jurisdiction outweigh the disadvantages, will they act.
JOEL JOHNSON

MAY NOT REFUSE To ANSWER
GRAND JURY-WITNESSES-WITNESS
QUESTIONS PREDICATED UPON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM UNLAWFUL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

The defendant's place of business was searched by agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation under a warrant issued in connection with a gambling investigation. The warrant was restricted
to the discovery and seizure of bookmaking records and wagering
materials. One federal agent, with knowledge of a current federal
investigation of loansharking activities, seized suspected loansharking records during the search.
A special grand jury investigating possible loansharking activities subpoened defendant to ask him questions concerning the evidence seized at his place of business. Defendant appeared before
the grand jury but refused to testify.1 After the Government requested transactional immunity for the defendant, 2 the District
Court ruled the search and seizure illegal and granted the defendant's motion for suppression and return of the seized evidence.3
The District Court further ordered that defendant need not answer
any of the grand jury's questions concerning the illegally obtained
4
evidence.
1. The defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 341 (1974).
2. Id. The Government moved for transactional immunity under Section 2514 of Title
18 of the United States Code which, in part, provides:
No such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty Or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is
compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence . .. against him in any court.
18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970).
•3. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 746 (N.D. Ohio 1971), a'f1d sub nom. United States
v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The defendant moved
for suppression and return of the evidence under Rule 41(e) of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which, in part, provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
If the motion is granted the propcourt . . . for the return of property ....
erty shall be restored and It shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearIg or trial.
Fzo. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
4. 32 F. Supp. at 746.

